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Marini v. Ireland (1970)
Protecting Low-Income Renters

by Judicial Shock Therapy
RICHARD H. CHUSED

Within a thirty-four-day period in 1970, courts in Illinois, Was~ington, D.C.,

and New Jersey announced decisions that dramatically altered a central aspect
of landlord-tenant law-the ability of landlords to summ~rily dispossess tenants
for failure to pay rent. Each decision reached essentially the same conclusion:
tenants were entitled to defend against summary dispossession if conditions
in their residences endangered health an,d safety or if there were other unfair
conditions imposed on their tenancies. These decisions opened the floodgates
of change. Other reformist court decisions or legislative enactments followed
in almost every state. The stories of the Illinois and D.C. decisions'. Rosewood v.
Fisher and]avins v. First National Realty, Corp., have been told elsewhere in great
detail,1 and most first-year law students around the nation read Javins in their
property law courses. But, surprisingly, the New Jersey Supreme Court's decision
in Marini v. Ireland has received much less attention. 2 Placing that decision more
solidly on the historical record is long overdue.
The importance of a major case is difficult to measure without knowing
something about the social, cultural, and historical background of the dispute.
Marini arose out of the maelstrom that was New Jersey in the 1960s. When I
arrived at Rutgers University School of Law in Newark during the summer of
1968 to begin my teaching career, Newark was in chaos. The Reverend Martin
Luther King Jr. had been assassinated on April 4. From July 12 to July 17 the summer before, rioting had left the core of the city in shambles. Whites had already
left the city in large numbers to move to the suburbs, and the flight ~ccelerated
after 1967. Within a few years of my arrival, many of the main businesses in
the downtown core downsized or closed, leaving empty building hulks behind.
Driving up Springfield Avenue-the main 1967 riot corridor-was to go through
a depressing stretch of poverty, gutted buildings, empty lots, and littered streets.
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Crime rates skyrocketed. The city, in short, was a wreck-the butt end of tragic
jokes on television and devastating commentaries in the media. It routinely was
placed on lists of the worst cities in America. 3
Camden, Newark's sister city in distress to the south and the site of the
building that gave rise to Marini, also was in terrible condition. Riots sparkec:1:,
by the police beating and death of a Puerto Rican motorist erupted in August
1971, not quite a year after Marini was decided by the New Jersey Supreme Court.
Major industrial facilities, including large plants run by RCA and the New York
Shipbuilding Corporation, downsized or closed during the 196os. 4 Between 1950
and 1970 the town's population declined by about 17 percent, and by an equal
amount from 1970 to 1980.5
The alarming situations in Newark, Camden, and other inner-city areas of
the nation's most densely populated state had a palpable impact on the New
Jersey Supreme Court's desire to bring landlord-tenant disputes before it and
on its overtly reformist resolution of the legal issues. Just as the relationships
among poverty, politics, urban disturbances, and the law in Washington, D.C.,
profoundly influenced the decision inJavins, so too the desperate situations in
Newark and other cities deeply affected judicial developments in New Jersey. 6
In this chapter, I reconstruct some of that history-presenting a portrait
of the times and describing some of the reasons the courts responded aggressively to the problems they perceived. To do that, I will tal<.e a four-stage journey. First, I will provide a few intimate, personal stories to bring to life how
desperately bad the situation in Newark, and by implication other New Jersey
cities, was in the late 1960s. Second, I will present a portrait of how the New
Jersey Supreme Court responded to the crisis. That will entail a trek through
landlord-tenant law as it was prior to the decision in Marini, as well as a look at
the court's decision in Reste Realty v. Cooper 7-a crucial opening gambit in the
reforms Marini instituted a year later. That tour should make it easier to understand why, as a matter of traditional legal logic, the Reste and Marini opinions
were partly untenable, if not incoherent. The extraordinary nature of the opinions symbolized the level of desperation felt by the New Jersey Supreme Court
and the compell:ing pow r of d em a nds among urban re id ents for h ange in
the operation of the state's landlord-tenant courts. The court must have concluded that eviction law needed some shock therapy. Third, I do not want to
leave the impression that New Jersey's high co urt behaved much differently or
more irrationally than courts in other states. A very brief description of events
elsewhere will make that clear. Finally, you might be curious about whether
all the ~oopla actually accomplished very much. I will end with a few brief
thoughts on that issue.
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Setting the Stage
The atmosphere at Rutgers Law School when I arrived in 1968 to join the faculty was tense and frenetic. You could cut the anxiety with a knife. After the
riot in 1967 and the assassination of Martin Luther King Jr. in 1968, the school
was the site of negotiations among representatives of the city, county, and state
governments with members of Newark's black community over what various
government entities, including the law school, should do. Those discussions
led to a deciston by Willard Heckel, then dean of the law school and a remarkable human being, and others in the law school community to seek approval
from the faculty to establish three clinics-the Constitutional Litigation Clinic,
the Administrative Process Project (a law school-run bureau in the state attorney general's office to create new methods to enforce fair housing laws), and
the Urban Legal Clinic-in that order at the rate of one a year. 8 At my first faculty meeting, the vote was taken and, not without controversy, the clinics were
approved. The Constitutional Litigation Clinic was established immediat.ely
and the other two followed. I was quickly thrust into discourse about the depth
of need in the Newark community for law reform and action, a a.iscourse that
deeply affects the structure of legal education in New Jersey to this day.
Other events were even more telling. Two stand out, both related to control
of the government of Newark by a corrupt, deeply racist white power structure.
Shortly after my arrival in Newark, lawyers and law teachers were asked to participate in a court-watching project at the city's municipal court. Stories about
mistreatment of black citizens by the court were legion. Various community
groups, as well as the local chapters of the American Civil Liberties Union and
the National Lawyers Guild, wanted to document them. Lawyers were sought out
for the court-watching task to reduce the likelihood that court personnel would
push the visitors around.
Down Broad Street I went with my yellow pad and pencil. I arrived early
and sat near the back-the only white person _in the public seating area. White
court personnel-bailiff, clerks, and others-milled around at the front. The mood
got ugly as those having business before the court began to arrive. The white court
personnel, spealdng quite loudly to ensure that those in the black audience heard
their remarks, began spouting verbal harangues about niggers, welfare queens,
absent fathers, and criminals. My jaw dropped in amazement. My yellow pad
began to fill up.
After a few minutes of this, one of the court officials came over and asked
me in a less than kindly manner what I was doing there. For the first time in
my life, I pulled rank, saying I had just arrived in town to tal<.e a job teaching at
Rutgers Law School and commenting that I wanted to see how things worked in
the city. He coolly stared at me for a moment and left me alone. But even after
the court personnel knew who I was, their nasty verbal assaults continued. They
must have thought their power was unchallengeable.
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The judge's attitude toward the litigants was not much better. Although he
did not use any overtly nasty language, his demeanor could be characterized at
best as curt. Anger among the court's clients was clearly visible in their body
language, tone of voice, and demeanor. The experience made clear to me more
than anything else could why the city had exploded in violence the year before.
Two years later much of the black political community1 supported Kenneth Gibson's campaign to become the first black mayor of the city. White
out-migration and black in-migration over the previous twenty years had
increased the possibility that a black candidate could win the seat. On Election Day in 1970, law faculty and students were asked by the Gibson ,campaign
to serve as poll watchers. A group was assigned to a spot in the all-white North
Ward. They were not greeted with open arms at the polling place. A law student and I were asked to pick them up when their shift was over. We went to
the polling place to meet the team and wall<.ed as a group back to the car. A
group of thugs chased us. We got away by the skin of our teeth-scrambling
into a Volkswagen Beetle as our pursuers bent the hinges of one door out of
shape just as we sped away. The drive back to the law school was frenetic as we
raced down the streets with one door unable to be fully closed. Our testimony
at an emergency chancery court hearing a short time later led to the impoundment of the ballot boxes. Newark, like other cities in the state with deeply felt
racial tensions, was a very nasty place. Although Gibson won the election, the
campaign's rough edges left an indelible impression on those living in both
Newark and the rest of New Jersey.
Such personal anecdotes only touch the surface of Newark's troubles in
the late 1960s and early 1970s. The rapidity and depth of the city's decline were
remarkable. Between 1950 and 1970, the population of the city fell by 13 percent.
But that single data point hides an incredible flow of humanity into and out of
Newark. In that same twenty years, the city was transformed from a majoritywhite to a majority-black metropolis-the white population of Newark declined
54 percent, while the nonwhite population increased by 183 percent. 9
Such dramatic shifts were accompanied by wholesale disruptions in the
fabric of urban life, striking changes in commuting patterns and job locations,
and a significant drop in the number of middle-class residents and resident
property owners. As middle-class whites left, they were not replaced by either a
similar number of people or a population as financially capable of buying property, maintaining businesses, and reconstructing a framework of social and economic life designed for the needs of the new residents. The transition was made
more difficult by the unwillingness of many majority-white financial and other
institutions to provide assistance or support to the incoming urban dwellers.
Social service organizations, nonprofit support groups, religious institutions,
and other establishments closed and often were not replaced.
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TABLE 2.1.

Changing Demographics of Newark
Year

Newark
total
population

White
population

1950

438,776

363,149

82.8

1960

405,220

265,889

65.6

26.8

139,331

1970

382,417

168,382

44.0

36.7

214,035

1980

329,248

101,417

30.8

39.8

227,831

1990

275,221

78,771

28.6

22.3

196,450

2000

273,546

72,490

26.5

8.0

201,056

%

% decline

population
white

in white
population

Nonwhite
population

75,627

Source: U.S. Census data, 1950-2000.

As George Sternlieb summarized the situation in his classic study, the
decline in Newark's housing stock was due in significant part to the decline of
resident ownership of leasehold property:
[T]here is no question of the significance of landlord residence, particularly single-parcel landlords, as insurance. of property maintenance of
slum tenements. Given the priority accorded by multiple-parcel owners
to tenant problems as an inhibitor [to upkeep] .. . the lack of feeling
on this score by resident landlords, coupled with their good record in
maintenance, is most significant. It is the resident landlord, and only the
resident landlord, who is in a position to properly screen and supervise
his tenantry. No one-shot wave of maintenance and paint up-sweep up
campaign can provide the day-to-day maintenance which is required in
slum areas. Given the relatively small size of Newark !enement units, and
others like them, this can only be accomplished by a resident landlord.
The record of these landlords .. . i_s such as to inspire confidence in their
future behavior on this score.10
The vast scope of problems confronting urban New Jersey was catalogued
by two reports issued in 1968-the Kerner Commission Report, assembled by
the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders convened by President
Lyndon Johnson in response to the nationwide stream of riots between 196s
and 1967, and the Report for Action, the lengthy commentary issued by the
Governor's Select Commission on Civil Disorder in the State of New Jersey.
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The Kerner Commission spent a great deal of time studying the situations in
Detroit and New Jersey-sites of two of the worst outbursts of urban disorder.11
In both the federal and state reports, concerns were expressed about tensions
between largely white police departments and residents of black communities,
poor housing conditions, the impact of urban renewal and highway construction programs, unemployment, dysfunctional schools, poo~ health care, and the
widespread perceptions that courts operated arbitrarily and unfairly.
Anyone living and working in New Jersey in the late 1960s knew that major
portions of the state were in deep trouble. Both politicians and courts sensed
a need for urgent action. Whether that sense of urgency emerged fro;n fears
about additional racial disorders or heartfelt desires to begin solving deep
social wounds made little difference. There was both a local and a national consensus that something had to be done. For a brief historical moment, major
legislative reforms were adopted and courts took risks by joining the efforts.
Congress adopted Civil Rights Acts in 1964, 1965, and 1968.12 The Office of Economic Opportunity was created in 1964 as part of President Johnson's War on
Poverty.13 Among many community-based initiatives, that agency developed the
still-extant Head Start and national legal services programs.

The Judicial Response
Given the distressing events occurring across the nation and in New Jersey, as
well as the growing restiveness and voting power of black citizens, it is easy to
understand why those sitting on the New Jersey Supreme Court felt there was
an urgent need to grapple with some of the issues within their control. They
certainly sensed that "rebellion" was brewing outside, that one of the commonly
articulated reasons for the riots in Newark and elsewhere in the state was the
perception among black and poor people that judicial forums they frequented
were unfair, and that reforms in some areas were long overdue.14 The New Jersey
Supreme Court then had a well-deserved reputation for initiating major reforms
in noncriminal legal doctrine,15 and the justices sitting on the court in the late
1960s and early 1970s, as a group, were generally open to arguments for chang•
ing existing law. 16
When presented with an opportunity to decide two landlord-tenant cases
shortly after Martin Luther King's assassination, the court moved forward with
its law reform agenda. On May 14, 1968, only forty days after King's death, the
justices agreed to review the appellate division decision in a commercial lease
dispute-Reste Realty Corp. v. Cooper. Arguments were heard on November 18,
and the decision was rendered the following year on March 17, 1969.17 The Reste
dispute, though not directly about the ability of residential tenants to raise
defenses when landlords sought their eviction for nonpayment of rent, still

MARINI v. IRELAND (1970)

29

provided the court with an opportunity to weaken or remove a series of old
legal obstacles to reforming landlord-tenant courts.
About six months after Reste was decided, the court, aware that Marini v. Ireland was pending in the appellate division, certified the case on its own motion
for immediate review. That action was unusual and spoke volumes about the
court's determination to deal with landlord-tenant issues. Arguments were
heard in short order on February 16, 1970, and the decision was issued only
three months later-on May 18, 1970-while the Gibson mayoral campaign was
gearing up.18

Preexisting Eviction Law
Why did landlord-tenant law become such a focus of attention for both those
agitating in the streets of Newark and those sitting on the New Jersey Supreme
Court? The state of the legal doctrine just before the justices heard arguments
in Reste was horribly outmoded. Its impact-deeply felt in impoverished urban
communities all across the nation-is best described by another tale. While in
law school, I went to visit the landlord-tenant court in Chicago as P!lrt of a 1967
summer internship working with a tenants' union on the near north side of the
city. I watched the long call of cases at the beginning of the court day. Most of
the calls went unanswered by tenants, leading to the issuance of default judgments for landlords. ·
When cases finally began to be called for "hearings" wher-c tenants had
shown up, they were handled in ·remarkably rapid fashion. The cases of a single
landlord were called in sequence so that lawyers representing different landlords would not have to constantly shuffle back and forth to the dais. Before
the landlords' lawyers could say anything, the judge usually asked the tenants,
"Have you paid the rent?" The answer generally was no. Without waiting for an
explanation, the judge would say, "Judgment for possession for [name of the
landlord]. Call the next case." In short, tenants were summarily evicted for not
paying rent no matter what the circumstances.
One particularly poignant case has stuck in my mind for these _last forty-five
years. I wrote about it in a 2007 article.
The cases were being called by the clerk when an elderly, thin, white
woman rose from her seat in response to hearing her name. Her gait
was quite slow-stooped over and supported bya wooden cane. She was
dressed in a frilly, long white dress and a white hat with a veil. It struck
me that she had picked out her finest clothes to wear that morning.
Perhaps her generation thought it appropriate to dress up for a court
appearance-like going to church. But this was no church. When she
was about half way to the front of the court-even before she passed
the bar-the judge impatiently asked, "Have you paid the rent?" She
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looked up at him as best she could and began softly speaking. "No,
but. ... " She was cut off in mid-sentence by the court curtly saying,
"Judgment for landlord. Call the next case." The woman continued to
slowly approach the bench, raising her right hand-her left still resting on the cane-as if she was trying to get the judge's attention. The
room became unusually quiet. Her apparent desire to continue talking
· was stopped by the judge who without a hint of emotion leaned forward and said, "Ma'am, your case has been decided. You can go now."
Crestfallen, she slowly turned and with small, careful steps, worked her
way toward the rear of the room. The next case was called and decided
before she reached the courtroom door. A few tenants watched her
sadly. Attention to her quickly faded as additional cases were called
and quickly disposed of. I was stunned. I often wonder what happened
to her. Where did she go? 19

,

What sort of theater was I watching? This was a courtroom where only one bit of
information was deemed important-whether the rent had been paid. No other
aspects of the landlord-tenant relationship were allowed to disturb the march
of "justice." The Chicago result was callous at best, but the court followed the
existing "law" to the letter-just as New Jersey courts did for decades in deciding
cases in exactly the same fashion. Two sets of legal rules combined to produce
these results-one dealing with the substantive nature of a lease and the other
with the procedures used to evict residential tenants. The combination produced tribunals that urban tenants viewed as blatantly favorable to landlords
and devoid of sympathy for the plight of even the most impoverished tenants
residing in deplorable conditions.
The early substantive law of land leases arose in largely agricultural settings. In return for virtually unchecked authority to use land, a tenant agreed to
pay rent, to maintain the land, and to return it in its original condition to the
owner when the lease expired. In those days, the most important asset leased
was usually the land itself. Requiring the tenant to maintain it was probably
sensible. As a result, English law provided for an "action in waste"-an action
by the true owner for damage to the property or to its value occurring during
possession by a nonowner like a ~enant, 20 a position absorbed into New Jersey's
statutes in 1795. 21 If, during the nineteenth century, a tenant destroyed a barn
or cut down all the timber (rather than just the amount needed to cook or keep
warm) on a parcel of land, the landlord could recover damages.
As New Jersey began to industrialize, the old rules were applied to commercial tenants without much thought about whether changing circumstances
should lead to changes in the rules. In Moore v. Townshend , the first leasehold
repair case decided by New Jersey's highest court, a landlord claimed that a
glassworks factory tenant failed to maintain the facilities, including the molds
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and tools which came with it. 22 The tenant was required to pay $550 to the landlord in damages.
This rule of waste law worked in tandem with limitations imposed by
nineteenth-century contract law and civil procedure rules. Traditionally, contract claims were limited to those arising from a single covenant or contractual provision. Defendants could raise only defenses specifically related to that
claim. What we now know as a counterclaim-the right to respond to a lawsuit
by filing another one back against the plaintiff-was barred. If a landlord sued
a tenant for the rent, the tenant could not defend by arguing that the landlord
had breached a promise to maintain the premises. Such a claim could only be
resolved in a separate case brought for that purpose. The claims by landlord and
tenant were independent of one another.
This is demonstrated well by the early twentieth century case of Stewart v.
Childs Co.23 Childs Company agreed to lease a building from Stewart for a restaurant and a "steam apparatus that perfects the coffee" in the basement. The
twenty-year term began in 1902. The lease agreement contained express covenants providing that the tenant would pay the $3,000 yearly rent when it fell
due and that the landlord would "at all times during the said lease keep the
said cellar waterproof at his own expense." The basement turned out not to
be waterproof. The landlord did not make repairs or install adequate puIJ?.ping equipment. As a consequence, Childs Company abandoned the premises
in 1909, and the landlord sued ~or rent. The court ruled that th'e covenant to
pay rent and the covenant to keep the basement dry were independent, that
"breach of the covenant to keep the cellar waterproof was not a defense to an
action for rent," and that the tenant had to pay the rent when it fell due despite
the fact that the landlord violated the terms of the lease.
The Childs Company attempted to defend the action for rent not only by
claiming that the dry basement covenant and the covenant to pay rent were
interdependent, but also that Childs had been "constructively evicted" from the
premises. Constructive eviction excused a tenant from the obligation to pay
rent when the landlord failed to deliver possession to the tenant or took actions
that deprived the tenant of all ability to use the premises. Even though a tenant's promise to pay rent was independent of virtually all the landlord's promises in a lease, a landlord still was obligated to leave the tenant in undisturbed
possession for the full term of the lease. That minimal level of mutuality was
required in order to prevent landlords from renting property, kicking tenants
out, and suing them for the rent.
Even though Childs Company was not able to operate its coffee equipment
or store goods in the basement, the court refused to find that it was constructively evicted. "We are unable to find," the court wrote, "any evidence that shows
that the landlord . . . did anything with the intention of depriving the tenant of
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the enjoyment of the premises." The tenant's right to possession of the building
was not disturbed. The tenant, after all, was free to arrange for the water to be
pumped out of the basement! While the lessee was free to file another case in
contract alleging breach of the dry basement covenant, the rent had to be paid
in the meantime. 24
The final piece of the nineteenth-century legal structure was put in place in
1847 when New Jersey adopted a statute permitting the summary dispossession
of nonpaying tenants. As towns and cities grew, pockets of poverty emerged,
transiency became more common, and migration to western areas of the nation
increased, and landlords began to complain about their inability to arrange for
speedy transitions from one tenant to another. Ejectment, the traditional claim
for possession of land, was slow, cumbersome, and laden with requirements
that sometimes protected tenants. 25 The same issues had arisen in New York
earlier in the century, resulting in adoption of "summary dispossess" legislation
in 1820. 26 The New York statute became the model for New Jersey twenty-seven
years later. A provision barring all appeals from summary actions was tossed in
for good measure. 27
As a result, New Jersey tenants not only were barred by substantive contract
rules from raising virtually all contractual defenses or filing any counterclaims to
suits seeking payment of overdue rent, but they also could be removed quickly if
they failed to pay. Those tenants with valid claims were forced to either continue
paying rent while they pursued their claims or cede possession and pursue their
issues later. In general, summary dispossess courts required quick responses by
tenants, barred use of counterclaims, and allowed removal of tenants in as little
as a month. The lack of legal assistance for poor urban tenants made it virtually impossible to mount a sustained judicial challenge to those practices or to
lobby legislatures for change. As a result, nineteenth-century eviction practices
remained intact until the New Jersey Supreme Court decided Reste and Marini.
There is no need to put a polite gloss on the situation. Landlord-tenant courts in
Newark and every other large city in the nation were ugly places. My experience
watching that elderly woman walk out of the courtroom in Chicago symbolized
the anguish of the era-a sometimes seething anger in minority and poor communities at the unwillingness of people in positions of authority to see unfairness even when it was literally staring them in the face.

Intervention of the New Jersey Supreme Court
Reste Realty v. Cooper was a surprising vehicle for the initiation of reforms in
New Jersey's residential landlord-tenant law. It was, after all, a commercial case.
After the landlord's oral promise to repair a leal<. allowing rainwater to seep into
the rented space went unfulfilled, the tenant moved out. On its face, it was a
simple constructive eviction dispute-one the court could easily have decided
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for the tenant without much ado. But the justices saw a chance to make some
pronouncements and, given the historical circumstances, took it. The court's
resolution of the litigation, a suit for rent against a tenant forced to relocate her
business because of rainwater leaking into the lower level of Reste's building,
led to.two important changes.
First, the court concluded that a lease was a modern contract, with its covenants and clauses part of a unified legal instrument structuring a relationship
between two people or entities. The residue of the old independent covenant
idea was washed away. Second, the test for constructive eviction was substantially eased. Rather than requiring tenants to show that they were permanently
deprived of possession by actions of the landlord, the court ruled that tenants
only had to show a material breach of the leasehold contract or some substantial interference with their right to possess the premises.
Highlighting the three kinds of legal verbiage used in the opinion makes
it easier to understand how extraordinary the court's results were. The first
change in the old constructive eviction requirement that a tenant be "permanently deprived of possession" involved property-law talk about the covenant of
quiet enjoyment-the boilerplate clause in every lease guaranteeing that a tenant's property right to possession will not be disturbed by the landlord during
the term of the lease. The second form of verbiage about "material breach" was
contract-law talk and took explicit advantage of the contract law .r.oncept favoring interdependence of the various clauses of a lease. The third form of verbiage
about "substantial interference with possession" was tort-law talk and placed
duties of care on landlords. Put more simply, the cou·rt pulled ideas from an
array of legal areas in its effort to modify preexisting rules. It suggests strongly
that the justices were searching for all available tools to support their landlordtenant law reform efforts.
Putting these ideas together, the tenant Cooper was allowed to use the
breach of the landlord's express promise to fix the water seepage problems as a
defense to the action for rent. She no longer had to file an indepen~ent action in
another court. She was able to claim that the breach so substantially interfered
with her possessory interest that she could either claim constructive eviction or
the right to cancel the lease contract because of a material breach. And she was
able to invoke the landlord's violation of its express duty of repair to justify her
decision to leave the premises. Along the way, the court also made liberal use
of exceptions to the parole evidence rule barring use of oral promises to modify
written agreements and the statute of frauds requiring that leases longer than a
year must be in writing to allow the tenant to use the landlord's oral promise to
repair for her benefit. 28 In reaching these conclusions, however, the court issued
a stream of dicta-statements in opinions not necessary to the decision. Rather
than deciding the case using the simplest and most traditional constructive
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eviction formula, the justices went out of their way to make pronouncements
reforming landlord-tenant law and signaling to the property bar that, as Bob
Dylan sang in 1964, "The times they are a-changin'."
The case actually involved two successive leases. The water leakage problems emerged during the first lease. When Cooper's business grew and she
w9:nted more space she negotiated a new lease agreement for a larger space.
During negotiations for the second lease, the landlord orally promised to fix
the water seepage problems that had arisen during the first lease term. Most
of the dicta arose from the court's handling of the first lease. Before the lanplord made the express oral promise to fix the water problems, Cooper had
signed the first lease acknowledging that she had inspected the premises and
promised to carry the burden of making repairs. The court first wrote a long
paragraph outlining the skimpy learning on tenant remedies in the courts and
law reviews around the nation. 29 It then noted that the source of the water
problems in the driveway that ran alongside the building was not in an area
controlled by the tenant and that she therefore had no duty to malce repairs.
The driveway was a common area under the control of the landlord. The court
went on to note that, even if the water problems were in the area leased by
Cooper, she still did not have to make repairs. State law, the court asserted,
had long since placed the repair burden for such major defects on the landlord,
especially when the defect was not discoverable or known by the tenant before
moving in. In essence a repair warranty for latent defects was implied.
I must add that it is not at all clear that any of the statutes cited by the court
as authority for placing the repair obligation on the landlord-generally housing
and building codes-operated to impose tort duties of maintenance on commercial landlords for spaces inside rented areas. That, of course, seemed not
to bother the court. In addition, all of this discussion about the first lease and,
most importantly, the language about implied warranties, was totally unnecessary to the result. It involved Cooper's status under the first lease, which was
not even in effect at the time Cooper left the premises. All the court had to do
was decide that Cooper was constructively evicted. Everything else was dicta.
The justices clearly went out of their way in this commercial case to write about
issues they knew were percolating in residential landlord-tenant law-the area
most disturbing to New Jersey's urban residents. 30
Reste, therefore, was a wild opinion. The court threw everything at the problem it could. Property talk gave way to both contract and tort talk, intermingled
in ways that are often impossible to untangle. Bargained-for duties of repair,
like the landlord's oral promise, were treated as interchangeable with tortlike
duties to repair. The court went out of its way to alter rules, create written contract clauses where none existed, enforce implied agreements that might not
have been made, create tort duties where none were necessary to resolve the
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dispute, and pay attention to all that anger and disorder welling up outside the
courthouse doors.
When all was said and done, the structure of suits for unpaid rent was dramatically altered. Combining the substantive legal changes enunciated in Reste
with the sea change in civil procedure that had occurred in New Jersey since the
nineteenth century, tenants became free to file defenses and counterclaims to
actions for rent just as defendants raised such issues in other sorts of cases. But
none of this touched summary dispossess court-the court dealing with actions
for possession for nonpayment of rent rather than suits for unpaid rent against
tenants who left before the end of their terms. The substantive rules of leases
and suits for rent were changed, but the summary dispossess court statutes
were not at issue in Reste. That, of course, was the much more difficult problem
taken up in Marini.

Marini v. Ireland
As noted, the New Jersey summary dispossess statute at issue in Marini originally barred appeals from summary dispossess decisions. When New Jersey
overhauled its civil procedure statutes and rules in 1951 to adopt many of the
same reforms introduced by adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in
1938, the summary dispossess s{atute was amended to allow appeal on issues
of jurisdiction while continuing to bar all other higher court reviews. Anyone
who has sat through Civil Procedure in the first year of law school knows that, if
a plaintiff makes a colorable claim for relief, the court has jurisdiction to hear
the matter. There may be defenses to the claim, but that does not disturb the
right of the court to entertain the underlying dispute. The rule is that a complaint well pleaded by a plaintiff provides jurisdiction. It doesn't guarantee a
victory, but it does guarantee a hearing. So, if appeal under the summary dispossess statute was available only on matters of "jurisdiction"-on the power
of a court to hear a case-the traditional understanding of that ·term barred
appellate courts from reviewing disputes over sufficiency of the evidence, the
availability of various defenses, or the underlying structure of substantive law.
In short, if the New Jersey Supreme Court was to hear the Marini dispute, it had
to do a hatchet job on the well-pleaded complaint rule and the meaning of the
word "jurisdiction." And that is exactly what the court did.
The case arose in a happenstance manner. Gordon Lewis, a legal services lawyer, was in landlord-tenant court in Camden one day with his usual load of cases.
Alice Ireland was there, trying without much success to explain her problems
with a toilet. Lewis went up to her and asked if he could help. She said yes, and
the rest, as they say, is history. The fact that a lawyer working for tenants was even
present represented a major shift in legal culture from a just a decade earlier.
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Some form of legal services for the poor had been around for a while, usually in the form of volunteer services or offices funded with donations from
lawyers and other generous souls. But these services and offices were usually
small and overwhelmed. The Ford Foundation was the first major organization
to display a deep interest in legal services for the poor. It 1funded some experimental programs in the early 1960s, including both offices with attorneys serving only the needy and law school clinical education programs. A major part of
President Johnson's War on Poverty was the creation of the Office of Economic
Opportunity (OEO) in 1964. It was an amazing agency, empowered to give grants
for community organizing and other local projects to help the poor. The goverp.ment actually gave out money to groups of people pursuing complaints against
local, state, and federal agencies.
Funding legal services programs was one of the first, most important and
(other than Head Start) only long-lasting effort of OEO. In the same year OEO
was established, Jean and Edgar Cahn published a seminal law review article
advocating the establishment of a nationally funded legal services program. 31
The Cahns were friends of Sargent Shriver, who had been appointed by President Johnson to run OEO. Their influence on Shriver's decision to begin funding legal services offices was critical. A large-scale grant program began in 1965.
This infusion of funds allowed new legal services offices to open all over the
country in the late 1960s, including the office where Gordon Lewis worked. 32
Ireland gave Lewis a copy of the summons and complaint in her summary
dispossess action, along with a plumber's bill and a cancelled check. Shortly
after she moved into 503B Rand Street in Camden in the spring of 1969, she
noticed that her toilet was leaking. After the landlord did not respond to
repeated requests for repairs, Ireland hired a plumber and paid the $85.72 repair
bill herself. When her July rent came due, she sent the landlord a copy of the bill,
along with a check for $9.28 to cover the difference between her rent and the
cost of the repair. Marini cashed the check but demanded that the remainder of
the rent be paid in cash. Ireland refused and was sued for possession on. July 23.
When the case was tried, the trial judge concluded that there was no
authority for "giving the right to tenant to engage plumber and have repairs
made, then deduct amt. from rent. "33 The tenant appealed and obtained a stay
of the eviction from the appellate division of the superior court. Pending resolution of the appeal, Ireland was orde~ed to pay Marini her monthly rent, except
for the month in question. The New Jersey Supreme Court took the unusual
step of certifying the case to itself for resolution before the appellate division
could hear the case. It also stayed, pending review, the judgment for possession
entered against her.
Several arguments were made on behalf of Alice Ireland in the appeal. 34
First, the claim was made that N.J.S. §2A:18-59-the section of the summary
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dispossess statute limiting appeal to matters of jurisdiction-violated the Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the United States Constitution. The following section, N.J.S. §2A:18-60, allowed cases "of sufficient importance" to be
transferred to the regular superior court, from which standard appeals were
available. The contention was that this difference in treatment was arbitrary
and made unfair distinctions between tenants.
Second, Ireland's side argued that, if the statute were valid, there was no
difference between jurisdiction and the merits of a case. If the tenant had a
defense that was denied, that decision on the merits raised jurisdictional
issues. And, finally, Ireland's lawyers asserted that Reste and other developments required the court to allow tenants to raise repair-and-deduct defenses
in actions brought for possession because of nonpayment of rent.
Gordon Lewis signed the brief for Ireland in the high court, but he was too
busy to do much of the writing. Ken Meiser, a VISTA legal services attorney, and
Joe Ippolito, then a third-year law student at Rutgers University School of Law
in Camden, composed it. 35 Years later, Ippolito nostalgically recalled working on
the case while he was a clinic student. 36 He was admitted to the bar just before the
case was argued before the New Jersey Supreme Court. As a nice gesture, a motion
was made at the beginning of the oral argument in Marini to add Ippolito's name
to the brief as an authpr. The court granted the motion immediately. 37
So what did the court do with the Marini case? N.J.S. §2A:18-53 prpvided
that a landlord could obtain possession where a tenant "shall hold over after
a default in the payment of rer'it, pursuant to the agreement under which the
premises are held." As is quite clear from the Marin( complaint, the landlord
alleged all the necessary aspects of such a claim: ownership by the landlord, possession under a valid lease, and default in the payment of rent. There really was
no question that, using standard meanings of legal terms, the Camden County
District Court had jurisdiction over the dispute. Under the summary dispossess
statute, appeal should have been barred.
But the court allowed the appeal. Whether rent was in default, Justice
Haneman opined, raised questions about both jurisdiction and the merits.
"Whatever," he wrote, '"jurisdiction' means in other settings, _here it uniquely
connotes the existence of one of the factual situations delineated in N.J.S.
§2A:18-53. It follows that a finding, by the judge, that there is a default as
alleged by the landlord, does not dispose of the meritorious issue alone. It as
well disposes of the jurisdictional issue. "38 Since the merits and jurisdiction
merged under this logic, the tenant could appeal the merits. Quick and niftybut surely this was totally out of sync with both the original purposes of the
summary dispossess proceeding and the standard well-pleaded complaint rule
used to evaluate the sufficiency of complaints ever since the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure were promulgated in 1938 and largely adopted in New Jersey
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in the 1950s. The court, by merging jurisdictional allegations and proof of the
merits, ignored the difference between the burden of pleading facts sufficient
to provide a court with jurisdiction and the burden of proving facts sufficient
to win a case once the court takes it. Presumably, the pressing social issues facing the court after the assassination of Martin Luther I~ing Jr. and the dismal
situation in New Jersey's urban areas led the court both to take the case away
from the appellate division on its own motion and to render a result virtually
unheard of in the annals of civil procedure courses everywhere.
After the court found it could entertain the appeal, it performed a second
major reconstruction of the meaning of N.J.S. §2A:r8-53 by holding that a default
in the payment of rent occurred only if the rent was "owing." Under the old rules
any unpaid rent was owing, period. Once the statute was construed this way, the
court was free to rerun the reasoning of Reste, imply a warranty obligating the
landlord to maintain the apartment according to the requirements of health
and safety regulations, and find in favor of the tenant. By doing so, the court not
only altered the old nineteenth-century notion that the conveyance of a period
of possession in return for the payment of rent was a contract independent from
the obligation to mal<.e repairs, it also took the critical step of moving the now
interdependent covenants-including the implied warranty to maintain the
premises-of a lease into summary dispossess court by allowing tenants to raise
defenses to eviction actions.
Today we would ask whether such a major and arguably incoherent reconstruction of prior law was justified by the need for social reform. Why not wait
for legislative action? In 1970, however, few doubted the wisdom of the court's
actions. The justices felt compelled to act, and most of us attuned to the travails
of landlord-tenant court at the time gave them a standing ovation for doing so.

Conclusion
The same extraordinary actions occurred elsewhere. As I noted in my Javins article, Judge Skelley Wright wrote an historically inaccurate but compelling opinion justifying the use of an implied warranty of habitability in Washington, D.C.
And as I have written in another.connection, the Illinois Supreme Court reconstructed the meaning of its summary dispossess statutes for the same reasons
at almost the same moment. Other state courts behaved in a similar fashion. In
short, the judicial creation of the implied warranty of habitability in landlordtenant courts all over the country between 1968 and 1973 resulted from a widespread sense that elderly women in veils should no longer be seen struggling out
of hearings bearing on their frail shoulders the weight of virtually uncontestable
judgments of eviction for nonpayment of rent.
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Did all of this legal reconstruction do any good? It certainly left most people with a sense that it was possible to obtain some justice in landlord-tenant
courts. Landlords declining to repair apartments now run the risk of getting
tied up in litigation and losing actions for possession for nonpayment of rent.
Fairness actually does break out from time to time. That certainly is worth a
significant round of applause. But, as a practical matter, little has changed for
most impoverished residential tenants. The few tenants who manage to obtain
legal assistance and happen to be living in substandard apartments may be better off. But the low budgets for legal services programs mean that the vast bulk
of tenants still do not receive legal help. Many fail to show up for hearings, have
no defenses to their evictions, or lack the ability to raise available issues pro se.
Most judges do not actively assist in raising defenses on behalf of unrepresented
tenants. Settlement agreements between landlords and tenants calling for the
continued payment of the regular rent plus installments on the arrears are routinely approved in most places without much inquiry.
The grotesque unfairness of 1968 has been replaced by a less charged version of the same scenario. Despite the na:ive hope of many in my generation
that providing defenses in landlord-tenant court .would help large numbers of
tenants and improve the quality of low-cost housing, most studies find that has
not happened. 39 The reasons, I thinl<., are clear. The notion that private prol')erty
owners can afford to provide good-quality housing for poor people is untenable.
If we want to house all of our fellow citizens in acceptable quarters, we as a society must be willing to foot the bill. Historically, we have been unwilling to do it.
Until we change that tune, all of us will continue to ~onfront daily evidence of
our culture's miserliness in the faces of the homeless and poor.
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Distresses, Rents, and the Renewal of Leases"). Spur:r:ed by economic dislocations of
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